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Federalism and the Disappearing Equal
Protection Rights of Immigrants
Kevin R. Johnson*
Abstract
Jenny-Brooke Condon’s article The Preempting of Equal
Protection for Immigrants? analyzes important issues
surrounding the constitutional rights of immigrants. Professor
Condon in essence contends that the current legislative, executive,
and scholarly focus on the distribution of immigration power
between the state and federal governments has undermined the
Equal Protection rights of legal immigrants in the United
States. Despite the contentious national debates over immigration
reform, immigrants’ rights have generally been of secondary
concern in contemporary immigration scholarship, which is now
dominated by analysis of immigration federalism.
Professor Condon undoubtedly is correct that we should not
lose sight of the rights of immigrants through a myopic focus on
federalism concerns. Courts should be vigilant to protect
noncitizens from the excesses of all governmental exercises of
power, including discrimination against immigrants by the
federal government.
This essay identifies two areas for future inquiry that build on
The Preempting of Equal Protection for Immigrants? First,
Professor Condon questions the arbitrary line-drawing between
the standards of review of state and federal alienage
classifications. But, she herself draws a questionable line by
advocating for greater protection of the constitutional rights of
legal immigrants, while stopping short of calling for the extension
*
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of rights to undocumented immigrants. However, all immigrants
are disenfranchised, lack direct political power, and frequently
suffer the disfavor of the majority in the political process. That
status militates in favor of strict scrutiny review of laws targeting
undocumented as well as lawful immigrants.
Second, if Professor Condon’s call for greater attention to the
Equal Protection rights of noncitizens is taken seriously, we must
examine the continuing vitality of the plenary power
doctrine. That exceptional doctrine shields from judicial review
invidious classifications under the U.S. immigration laws,
including discrimination that would be patently unconstitutional
if applied to U.S. citizens; those laws historically have
discriminated against noncitizens who are racial minorities, poor,
disabled, women, political dissidents, and others. Dismantling
what is known as “immigration exceptionalism” has long puzzled
immigration law scholars. Professor Condon reminds us of the
need to reconsider the constitutional immunity for immigrant
admissions and removal criteria.
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I. Introduction
Jenny-Brooke Condon’s article The Preempting of Equal
Protection for Immigrants?1 thoughtfully analyzes important
issues surrounding the constitutional rights of immigrants.
Professor Condon contends that the current legislative, executive,
and scholarly focus on the distribution of immigration power
between the state and federal governments has undermined the
Equal Protection rights of legal immigrants in the United States.2
Despite the contentious national debates over immigration
reform, immigrants’ rights have generally been of secondary
concern in contemporary immigration scholarship, which today is
dominated by analysis of immigration federalism.3
In an era in which the Supreme Court has moved toward
greater consistency in Equal Protection doctrine,4 Professor
Condon examines a jarring incongruence in the Court’s alienage
jurisprudence. The Court has required strict scrutiny review of

1. Jenny-Brooke Condon, The Preempting of Equal Protection for
Immigrants?, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 77 (2016).
2. See id. at 160–63 (arguing that Equal Protection jurisprudence with
respect to immigrants’ rights needs “realignment”).
3. See, e.g., Kerry Abrams, Plenary Power Preemption, 99 VA. L. REV. 601
(2013); Jennifer M. Chacón, The Transformation of Immigration Federalism, 21
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 577 (2012); Stella Burch Elias, The New Immigration
Federalism, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 703 (2013); Clare Huntington, The Constitutional
Dimension of Immigration Federalism, 61 VAND. L. REV. 787 (2008); Cristina M.
Rodríguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH.
L. REV. 567 (2008); Juliet P. Stumpf, States of Confusion: The Rise of State and
Local Power Over Immigration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1557 (2008). However, there are
exceptions. See, e.g., Geoffrey Heeren, Persons Who Are Not the People: The
Changing Rights of Immigrants in the United States, 44 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 367 (2013) (contending that the rights of noncitizens often are lost in court
decisions that focus on federalism and administrative law doctrines); Joseph
Landau, Due Process and the Non-Citizen: A Revolution Reconsidered, 47 CONN.
L. REV. 879 (2015) (analyzing how modern due process doctrine has expanded
the rights of immigrants).
4. See, e.g., Adarand Constr., Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)
(holding that strict scrutiny applies to all racial classifications, including those
employed in programs designed to remedy past discrimination); see also Victor
C. Romero, The Congruence Principle Applied: Rethinking Equal Protection
Review of Federal Alienage Classifications After Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Peña, 76 OR. L. REV. 425, 429 (1997) (contending that the Supreme Court’s
decision in Adarand militates in favor of meaningful judicial review of federal
alienage classifications).
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state-based discrimination against lawful immigrants.5 In stark
contrast, the Court has exercised extremely deferential review of
federal alienage classifications.6
Although deviating from the review standard for state
alienage classifications as well as conventional Equal Protection
doctrine, deference to federal alienage classifications is consistent
with a line of cases originating in the late eighteenth century.
Those decisions established the extraordinary “plenary power”
doctrine; the Supreme Court has proclaimed that, because
Congress and the Executive Branch possess “plenary power” over
immigration, federal immigration laws are effectively immune
from ordinary judicial review of their constitutionality.7 In
creating that doctrine, the Court upheld racial discrimination in a
series of laws designed to exclude and deport Chinese immigrants
from the United States. Despite the intervening constitutional
revolution of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court has yet to
overrule, or significantly limit, its plenary power decisions.8
Professor Condon reviews several developments that have
allowed the application of the deferential standard of review
applicable to federal alienage classifications to shield state
classifications from constitutional review. Her rights-focused
approach forcefully responds to the thrust of much major
immigration impact litigation and the trend of congressional and
federal delegation of immigration authority to the states, as well
5. See infra notes 18–25 and accompanying text (noting justifications for
strict scrutiny of alienage classifications).
6. See infra notes 26–37 and accompanying text (questioning the Supreme
Court’s failure to subject federal alienage classifications to strict scrutiny).
7. See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893)
(upholding a law targeting Chinese immigrants for deportation); Chae Chan
Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889)
(rejecting constitutional challenges to law requiring the exclusion of Chinese
noncitizens from the United States). For capsule summaries of the plenary
power doctrine, see Kevin R. Johnson, Minorities, Immigrant and Otherwise,
118 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 77 (Oct. 2008); Michael Kagan, Plenary Power is
Dead! Long Live Plenary Power!, 114 MICH. L. REV FIRST IMPRESSIONS 21 (2015).
8. See Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation’s Last Stronghold: Race
Discrimination and the Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1,
5–6 (1998) (“[T]he plenary power doctrine is said to make racial discrimination
in the immigration context lawful per se.”); Louis Henkin, The Constitution and
United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100
HARV. L. REV. 853 (1987) (criticizing the Supreme Court decisions upholding the
discriminatory Chinese exclusion laws).
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as the trajectory of contemporary immigration scholarship.9
Professor Condon specifically contends that the reliance on
federal preemption doctrine to displace state immigration
enforcement laws has undermined the constitutional rights of
immigrants.10 In consistently finding that federal power trumps
state power over immigration, courts have effectively placed
greater authority over the rights of immigrants in the hands of
the federal government, which has few legal constraints on how it
treats immigrants. Moreover, express congressional delegation of
authority to the states to deny public benefits to immigrants in
1996 welfare reform legislation,11 has removed discriminatory
state laws from strict scrutiny review, with discrimination
against lawful immigrants tolerated, and arguably encouraged,
by a deferential review standard applicable to federal alienage
classifications.12 The overall result is the dilution of the
constitutional rights of immigrants.
Professor Condon cautions us to not lose sight of the rights of
immigrants through a myopic focus on federalism concerns.
Courts should be vigilant to protect noncitizens from the excesses
of all governmental exercises of power, including those of the
federal government.
This essay identifies two areas for future inquiry that build
on The Preempting of Equal Protection for Immigrants? First,
Professor Condon questions the arbitrary line-drawing between
the standards of review of state and federal alienage
classifications. But, she herself draws a questionable line by
advocating greater protection of the constitutional rights of legal
immigrants, while stopping short of calling for the extension of
rights to undocumented immigrants. However, all immigrants,
legal and unauthorized, are disenfranchised, lack direct political
9. See infra Part III (arguing that the federal preemption doctrine at
times has failed to adequately protect the rights of immigrants).
10. See Condon, supra note 1, at 125–28 (summarizing cases in which the
Supreme Court employed federal preemption doctrine in reviewing laws
affecting immigrants).
11. See infra note 51 and accompanying text (noting that the Executive
Branch has aggressively enforced the criminal removal provisions of the
immigration laws, only to have the Supreme Court reject a number of those
efforts).
12. See Condon, supra note 1, at 129–50 (making this point).
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power, and frequently suffer the disfavor of the majority in the
political process. That insularity favors strict scrutiny review of
laws targeting undocumented as well as lawful immigrants.13
Second, if Professor Condon’s call for greater attention to the
Equal Protection rights of noncitizens is taken seriously, we must
examine the continuing vitality of the much-criticized plenary
power doctrine. That exceptional doctrine shields from
meaningful judicial review invidious classifications under the
U.S. immigration laws, including discrimination that would be
patently unconstitutional if applied to U.S. citizens; those laws
historically have discriminated against noncitizens who are racial
minorities, poor, disabled, women, political dissidents, and
others.14 Dismantling what is known as “immigration
exceptionalism”15 long has perplexed immigration law scholars.16
It deserves our utmost attention.
II. An Unjustifiable Equal Protection Dichotomy?
Professor Condon directs attention to a glaring dichotomy in
the Supreme Court’s Equal Protection jurisprudence concerning
the review of alienage classifications. It was not established by
antiquated decisions. but instead is the product of two cases
decided just a few years ago.17
13. See infra Part IV.A. (discussing the need to protect the rights of
undocumented immigrants).
14. See generally KEVIN R. JOHNSON, THE “HUDDLED MASSES” MYTH:
IMMIGRATION AND CIVIL RIGHTS (2004) (analyzing the history of discrimination
against various minorities under the U.S. immigration laws and their
enforcement); Michele Goodwin & Erwin Chemerinsky, No Immunity: Race,
Class, and Civil Liberties in Times of Health Crisis: On Immunity: An
Inoculation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 956, 965–76 (2016) (summarizing the racial and
class impacts of health exclusions in the U.S. immigration laws).
15. See generally Hiroshi Motomura, Federalism, International Human
Rights, and Immigration Exceptionalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1361 (1999);
Rachel E. Rosenbloom, The Citizenship Line: Rethinking Immigration
Exceptionalism, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1965 (2013).
16. For sources discussing the plenary power doctrine, see generally T.
ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY (2002); GERALD L.
NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION (1996).
17. See Gilbert Paul Carrasco, Congressional Arrogation of Power: Alien
Constellation in the Galaxy of Equal Protection, 74 B.U. L. REV. 591, 603–05
(1994) (contending that congressional delegation to the states of the power to
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In Graham v. Richardson,18 the Supreme Court in 1971
addressed a challenge to state laws restricting the eligibility of
certain lawful permanent residents for public benefit programs. It
unanimously held that:
[T]he Court’s decisions have established that classifications
based on alienage, like those based on nationality or race, are
inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny.
Aliens as a class are a prime example of a “discrete and
insular” minority (see United States v. Carolene Products Co.,
304 U.S. 144, 152–53, n.4 (1938)) for whom such heightened
judicial solicitude is appropriate.19

Consistent with modern Equal Protection doctrine, the Court
classified lawful immigrants as a “suspect class” and subjected
state laws that discriminate against them to strict scrutiny; such
laws can be upheld only if justified by a compelling governmental
interest. In applying that exacting standard of judicial review,
the Court not surprisingly invalidated state restrictions on
benefit receipt by lawful permanent residents.20
General Equal Protection jurisprudence favors strict scrutiny
review of laws that discriminate against discrete and insular
minorities, including immigrants.21 Lawfully disenfranchised,
lawful permanent residents lack direct political power.22 Political
deny benefits to immigrants is unconstitutional); Romero, supra note 4, at 430–
38 (examining the disjunction in Supreme Court decisions between judicial
review of state and federal alienage classifications).
18. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
19. Id. at 371–72 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
20. See id. at 376. For skepticism about the Court’s adoption of strict
scrutiny review in Graham v. Richardson, see Michael Scaperlanda, Partial
Membership: Aliens and the Constitutional Community, 81 IOWA L. REV. 707,
722–23 (1996).
21. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW 161–62 (1980) (contending that immigrants constitute a
discrete and insular minority and, consequently, that laws that discriminate
against them should be subject to strict scrutiny); David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54
STAN. L. REV. 953, 981 (2002) (“When one adds to . . . the ignoble history of antiimmigrant sentiment among the voting citizenry, usually laced with racial
animus, aliens are a group particularly warranting judicial protection.”); Neal
Katyal, Equality in the War on Terror, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1365, 1383–84 (2007)
(“Executives that seek to harness the benefits of deference in court would . . . be
well advised to avoid blatant discrimination on the basis of alienage.”).
22. See Jamin B. Raskin, Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The Historical,
Constitutional, and Theoretical Meanings of Alien Suffrage, 141 U. PA. L. REV.
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disempowerment was the rationale offered by the Supreme Court
in the famous Carolene Products footnote four for strict scrutiny
review of laws disadvantaging “discrete and insular minorities.”
Due to their political powerlessness and insularity in
American society, immigrants historically have been the subject
of the wrath of the political process in the United States,
including a great many punitive laws.23 To make matters worse, a
majority, although far from all, immigrants are people of color.24
As a result, the immigration laws arguably have been employed
at various times as a proxy for race and a means to discriminate
against racial minorities.25 The specter of racial discrimination,
accomplished through the reliance on alienage classifications,
renders many immigrants as a discrete and insular minority in
two distinct respects, thus strongly favoring strict scrutiny review
of laws that discriminate against them.
In 1976, the Supreme Court in Mathews v. Diaz26
unanimously articulated the polar opposite of strict scrutiny
1391, 1391–94 (1993) (questioning the near-universal disenfranchisement of
lawful permanent residents); Gerald M. Rosberg, Aliens and Equal Protection:
Why Not the Right to Vote?, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1092, 1092 (1977) (to the same
effect). Although immigrants indirectly exercise political power separate and
apart from the ballot box, their inability to vote significantly constrains those
efforts. See JOHN TIRMAN, DREAM CHASERS: IMMIGRATION AND THE AMERICAN
BACKLASH 91–109 (2015) (discussing the emergence of the undocumented college
students known as DREAMers as a potent force in American politics); Daniel
Kanstroom, “Alien” Litigation as Polity-Participation: The Positive Power of a
“Voteless Class of Litigants”, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 399, 400, 439 (2012)
(analyzing the use of litigation as a political tool by immigrant rights activists)
23. See generally JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF
AMERICAN NATIVISM, 1860-1925 (4th ed. 2002) (documenting the events
culminating in congressional passage of a restrictive national origins quotas
system in 1924); JOHNSON, supra note 14 (analyzing the history of
discrimination against various minority groups in the U.S. immigration laws).
24. See Kevin R. Johnson, The End of “Civil Rights” as We Know It?:
Immigration and the Civil Rights Law in the New Millennium, 49 UCLA L. REV.
1481, 1491–1510 (2002) (explaining how immigration from Mexico has changed
the racial composition of the U.S. population).
25. See generally Kevin R. Johnson, A Case Study of Color-Blindness: The
Racially Disparate Impacts of Arizona’s S.B. 1070 and the Failure of
Comprehensive Immigration Reform, 2 UC IRVINE L. REV. 313 (2012) (analyzing
the racially disparate impacts of the enforcement of state immigration
enforcement laws as well as the potential positive impacts on Latina/o
immigrants and their families of the passage of comprehensive immigration
reform).
26. 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
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In the exercise of its broad power over naturalization and
immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be
unacceptable if applied to citizens. The exclusion of aliens and
the reservation of the power to deport have no permissible
counterpart in the Federal Government’s power to regulate the
conduct of its own citizenry. The fact that an Act of Congress
treats aliens differently from citizens does not in itself imply
that such disparate treatment is “invidious.”27

In a footnote, the Court explained that
[a]ny policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven
with contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of
foreign relations, the war power, and the maintenance of a
republican form of government. Such matters are so exclusively
entrusted to the political branches of government as to be
largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference.28

In applying an extremely deferential review standard, the Court
not surprisingly upheld a congressional restriction on the
eligibility of lawful permanent residents for federal benefits.
The toothless standard of review applied by the Supreme
Court in Mathews v. Diaz to a federal alienage classification is a
far cry from the strict scrutiny review of state alienage
classifications adopted in Graham v. Richardson. However, the
political process defect that results in suspect classification status
and strict scrutiny review of state alienage classifications in
Graham applies with equal force to alienage classifications in the
federal laws. As the Court emphasized without qualification,
“[a]liens as a class are a prime example of a ‘discrete and insular’
minority.”29 The inconsistency of the judicial review standards
thus is difficult to justify as a matter of constitutional law.30
The deferential approach of Mathews v. Diaz, along with the
justification offered by the Supreme Court, unquestionably
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 79–80.
Id. at 81 n.17 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. at 372.
See Brian Soucek, The Return of Noncongruent Equal Protection, 83
FORDHAM L. REV. 155, 173–86 (2014) (analyzing the Supreme Court’s
inconsistent approaches to constitutional review of state and federal alienage
classifications).
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sounds of the plenary power doctrine, which has historically
immunized from judicial review the judgments of Congress about
which immigrants to admit into, as well as to deport from, the
United States.31 However, Mathews v. Diaz applied the doctrine
to the review of a federal law that discriminates against
immigrants lawfully admitted to—and physically present in—the
United States, not noncitizens seeking entry into, or facing
removal from, the country.32
To an immigration law professor, it is striking that Professor
Condon discusses Mathews v. Diaz but does not analyze in any
detail the fact that it is firmly rooted in the plenary power
doctrine.33 Immigration professors regularly cite Mathews v. Diaz
as the modern reaffirmation, if not problematic extension, of that
extraordinary doctrine.34
In Mathews v. Diaz, the Supreme Court need not have
invoked the plenary power doctrine. It instead could have ruled
that lawful permanent residents physically present in the United
States deserve full Equal Protection rights, including strict
scrutiny review of federal alienage classifications. That would
have mirrored the review standard applicable to state alienage
classifications under Graham v. Richardson,35 a congruence that
would be generally consistent with the thrust of modern Equal
Protection doctrine.36 In so doing, the Court need not have
31. See supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text (discussing the roots of the
plenary power doctrine).
32. See Soucek, supra note 30, at 199 (“The problem in Diaz is that the
alienage-based Medicare restrictions at issue in that case were not, in any
obvious way, part of immigration law at all.”).
33. See Condon, supra note 1, at 100 n.96 (citing scholarship analyzing the
influence of the plenary power doctrine on the Court’s holding in Mathews v.
Diaz).
34. See, e.g., Allison Brownell Tirres, Mercy in Immigration Law, 2013
BYU L. REV. 1563, 1599 (analyzing Mathews v. Diaz).
35. Cf. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (holding that the Fifth
Amendment prohibits racial segregation by the federal government, just as the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment bars racial
discrimination by the states); Kenneth L. Karst, The Fifth Amendment’s
Guarantee of Equal Protection, 55 N.C. L. REV. 541, 542 (1977) (analyzing the
Equal Protection guarantee applicable to the federal government).
36. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (citing sources discussing the
Court’s contemporary Equal Protection jurisprudence). Hiroshi Motomura
sketches an Equal Protection model incorporating Graham v. Richardson and
Mathews v. Diaz in Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration and Alienage, Federalism
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resolved the question of the appropriate constitutional review of
the provisions governing the admission of noncitizens to, or
deportation from, the United States.37
III. The Failure of Federal Preemption Doctrine to Protect
Immigrant Rights
In challenges to a virtual plethora of recent state
immigration enforcement laws fueled by public concern with
undocumented immigration,38 litigants have relied primarily on
the Supremacy Clause39 and federal preemption doctrine, not the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Even if
the true hope was to protect the rights of immigrants, the legal
question directly presented in those cases involved the boundary
between state and federal power over immigration regulation.
Although understanding that preemption doctrine frequently has
proven successful as a litigation strategy, Professor Condon
observes that it has not always ensured adequate protection of
the rights of immigrants.40
“In recent years, both the United States Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence addressed to immigrants’ treatment by the states
and an extensive scholarly literature, have focused heavily on
immigration federalism.”41 A leading example is the Supreme
and Proposition 187, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 201, 205–14 (1994).
37. See infra Part IV.B. (considering the appropriate scope of constitutional
review of the immigration laws).
38. See Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Donald Trump’s False Comments Connecting
Mexican
Immigrants
and
Crime,
WASH. POST
(July
8,
2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2015/07/08/donaldtrumps-false-comments-connecting-mexican-immigrants-and-crime/ (last visited
July 2, 2016) (analyzing critically Donald Trump’s derogatory comments about
Mexican immigrants and characterizing them as criminals) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Full Text: Donald Trump Announces a
Presidential
Bid,
WASH.
POST
(June
16,
2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/06/16/full-textdonald-trump-announces-a-presidential-bid/ (last visited July 2, 2016)
(reprinting speech in which Trump announced that he would run for President)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
39. U.S. CONST. art. VI, para. 2.
40. See Condon, supra note 1, at 125–28.
41. Id. at 80 (footnote omitted).
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Court’s 2012 decision in Arizona v. United States,42 which
invalidated on federal preemption grounds core provisions of
Arizona’s S.B. 1070, a state immigration enforcement law that
many commentators feared would increase discrimination
against Latina/os by state and local law enforcement officers.
Dutifully following the lead of Arizona v. United States, the
lower courts regularly employ federal preemption doctrine to
invalidate central provisions of state immigration enforcement
laws.43 In large part, that focus results from the fact that litigants
have frequently relied on preemption as a litigation strategy.
Preemption challenges avoid the doctrinal impediments to Equal
Protection claims, including the uncertainty of the standard of
constitutional review given that the Supreme Court has not
consistently applied strict scrutiny review to alienage
discrimination as called for by Graham v. Richardson.44 In
addition, the discriminatory intent required to establish a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause serves as a formidable
barrier to constitutional challenges to state immigration
enforcement laws.45
Professor Condon expresses skepticism about the focus on
federal preemption, rather than the constitutional rights of
42. 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012); see Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 563 U.S.
582, 600 (2011) (holding that an Arizona law allowing for the revocation of the
licenses of business that employ undocumented immigrants was not preempted
by federal immigration law).
43. See, e.g., United States v. South Carolina, 720 F.3d 518 (4th Cir. 2013);
United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2012); Ga. Latino Alliance
for Human Rights v. Georgia, 691 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2012).
44. See Condon, supra note 1, at 91–98 (analyzing the exceptions created
by the Supreme Court to Graham v. Richardson’s strict scrutiny review of state
alienage classifications).
45. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240–42 (1976) (holding that, to
prevail on an Equal Protection claim, a plaintiff must establish a
“discriminatory intent” by a state actor); see, e.g., United States v. Armstrong,
517 U.S. 456, 470 (1996) (finding that, despite overwhelming statistical evidence
of racially disparate impacts on African-Americans of crack cocaine
prosecutions, plaintiffs had failed to establish an Equal Protection claim);
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 298–99 (1987) (same in death penalty case).
The barriers to Equal Protection challenges make litigation likely to put an end
to only the most egregious patterns and practices of discrimination. See, e.g.,
Melendres v. Arpaio, 784 F.3d 1254, 1257 (9th Cir. 2015) (affirming in large part
an injunction designed to end a pattern and practice of discrimination against
Latina/os by a local law enforcement agency).

DISAPPEARING EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS

281

immigrants, in contemporary challenges to state immigration
enforcement laws.46 In her view, this approach “elevat[es]
deference to the federal government’s power to set immigration
policy over a previously established constitutional commitment
[in cases like Graham v. Richardson] to immigrants’ equal
treatment by the states.”47 The fundamental concern shared by,
among others, Harold Koh,48 is that the undue focus on
federalism sacrifices the Equal Protection rights of noncitizens.
Professor Condon specifically questions the propriety of weak
Equal Protection rights for immigrants with respect to the federal
government but strong rights with respect to the states.49
Although anti-immigrant sentiment arguably is voiced more
forcefully at the state and local levels than on the national scene,
it unquestionably exists at the federal level. Indeed, the disfavor
of certain groups of lawful immigrants in the national political
process can be seen in many contemporary acts of Congress.
Congress, for example, in 1996 welfare reform legislation
authorized the states to deny benefits to lawful immigrants.50
Similarly, 1996 immigration reform legislation and other laws
have greatly expanded the removal grounds for lawful permanent
residents convicted of crimes.51 As one influential commentator
46. See Condon, supra note 1, at 125–28.
47. Id. at 77 (footnote omitted).
48. See Harold Hongju Koh, Equality with a Human Face: Justice
Blackmun and the Equal Protection of Aliens, 8 HAMLINE L. REV. 51, 98–99
(1985) (stating that federal preemption doctrine “effectively subordinates
fourteenth amendment equal protection doctrine governing discrimination
against resident aliens to the vagaries of federal immigration policy.”).
49. See Condon, supra note 1, at 98–102.
50. See id. at 121–23; Gregory T. Rosenberg, Alienating Aliens: Equal
Protection Violations in the Structures of State Public-Benefit Schemes, 16 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 1417, 1425 (2014) (“[The Personal Responsibility and Works
Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996)]’s most significant
change with respect to aliens and public benefits was the delegation to the
states of the authority to restrict or expand alien [benefit] eligibility.”).
51. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009. The Executive Branch has
aggressively enforced the criminal removal provisions of the immigration laws,
only to have the Supreme Court reject a number of removal orders. See, e.g.,
Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1983 (2015) (setting aside a removal order
based on a drug paraphernalia conviction); Moncrieffe v. Holder 133 S. Ct. 1678,
1693-94 (2013) (same for conviction of possession of a small amount of
marijuana).
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succinctly observed, the 1996 reforms, which greatly restricted
judicial review of removal and other orders, constituted “the most
radical reform of immigration law in decades—or perhaps ever.”52
Professor Condon notes that “the assumption that the federal
government is more protective of immigrant rights than the
states over-simplifies the complex nature of federal immigration
regulation and, in many instances, is simply inaccurate.”53 As is
the case for state laws, federal law can be rather unforgiving
toward immigrants, even ones lawfully in the United States.
That development can be explained by the fact that, in both
instances, immigrants are discrete and insular minorities and are
legally prevented from full participation in the political process.
Professor Condon observes that
[a]lthough [the] interplay between federalism and equality has
long existed in the equal protection jurisprudence involving
immigrants, in the recent cases . . . federal immigration policy
has played a more disruptive role, transforming equal
protection doctrine involving state alienage classification into
a preemption-like inquiry that privileges Congressional policy
choices.54

In instances in which Congress has permitted discrimination by
the states against immigrants, the end result has been to shift
the review standard from rigorous strict scrutiny review of
Graham v. Richardson to the highly deferential approach of
Mathews v. Diaz. As Professor Condon puts it, “[t]he rightsenhancing theory of federalism treats congressional policy as a
gatekeeper to Fourteenth Amendment rights, allowing Congress
to decide who has claims to such rights.”55
To illustrate her point that Congress has delegated power to
the states to discriminate, Professor Condon analyzes the court of
appeals decision in Soskin v. Reinertson,56 and other cases
challenging congressional authorization of state denial of public
benefits to lawful immigrants.57 She understands the delegation
52. PETER H. SCHUCK, CITIZENS, STRANGERS, AND IN-BETWEENS 143 (1998).
53. Condon, supra note 1, at 120 (footnote omitted).
54. Id. at 84 (footnote omitted).
55. Id. at 118 (footnote omitted).
56. 353 F.3d 1242 (10th Cir. 2004) (rejecting a challenge to a Colorado law
that denied healthcare benefits to lawful permanent residents).
57. See Condon, supra note 1, at 103–04 (discussing, inter alia, Korab v.
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as diluting the constitutional protections for immigrants; in
effect, Congress has encouraged the states to deny benefits to
immigrants lawfully admitted into the United States, a result
that Graham v. Richardson condemned. As Professor Condon
states,
“[t]he
supplanting
of
Fourteenth
Amendment
antidiscrimination norms with a doctrine disproportionately
focused on congressional policy undermines Graham’s promise of
equal treatment by the states. Or, more simply, it signals a
preempting of equal protection for immigrants.”58
Similarly, with the support and encouragement of Congress,
the Executive Branch has enlisted state and local governments in
the enforcement of the U.S. immigration laws, particularly with
respect to immigrants who encounter the criminal justice
system.59 State and local governments have increasingly resisted
full cooperation with the immigration enforcement fervor of the
U.S. government.60
Professor Condon correctly contends that federal preemption
of state law provides limited, indirect, and incomplete protections
of the rights of immigrants. For example, in Arizona v. United
States,61 the Supreme Court upheld Section 2(B) of Arizona’s S.B.
1070, which requires local police to inquire about the immigration
status of persons who they reasonably suspect are in the country
in violation of the U.S. immigration laws.62 Section 2(B)
Fink, 748 F.3d 875 (9th Cir. 2014)). Other commentators also have questioned
the constitutionality of congressional efforts to allow the states to deny public
benefits to immigrants. See, e.g., Carrasco, supra note 17, at 603–05; Mel
Cousins, Equal Protection: Immigrants’ Access to Healthcare and Welfare
Benefits, 12 HAST. RACE & POVERTY L.J. 21 (2015); David Wurzburg, Legalized
Discrimination? Not in My State: State-Court Challenges to the Discriminatory
Provisions of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 1996, 21 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 251 (2014).
58. Condon, supra note 1, at 142 (emphasis added).
59. See Kevin R. Johnson, Doubling Down on Racial Discrimination: The
Racially Disparate Impacts of Crime-Based Removals, 66 CASE W.L. REV. 993,
1010–25 (2016) (summarizing increased state and local involvement in federal
immigration enforcement).
60. See, e.g., Huyen Pham, The Constitutional Right Not to Cooperate?
Local Sovereignty and the Federal Immigration Power, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1373
(2006); Rose Cuison Villazor, What Is a “Sanctuary”?, 61 SMU L. REV. 133
(2008).
61. 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
62. Id. at 2507–10.
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contributed to fears of increased racial profiling of Latina/os by
state and local law enforcement agencies.63 Although it
invalidated other provisions of the Arizona law, the Court found
that Section 2(B) was not preempted by federal law. Emphasizing
the primacy of federal power over immigration, the U.S.
government did not fashion the legal challenge to S.B. 1070 as
one about the violation of the rights of noncitizens. Consequently,
the litigants, and ultimately the Supreme Court, avoided any
direct claim based on the rights of immigrants. The rights of
immigrants ultimately were buried in a case that legally became
one about federal versus state power over immigration.64
IV. The Questions Raised by Professor Condon’s Line-Drawing
Although Professor Condon’s article focuses on the rights of
lawful immigrants, her analysis implicates important questions
about the rights of undocumented and prospective immigrants.
A. No Protection for the Most Vulnerable Immigrants
Professor Condon’s article is limited to the Equal Protection
rights of lawful immigrants, not the rights of undocumented
immigrants.65 Although recognizing that the rights of all
immigrants are related, she nonetheless states that the rights of
the undocumented are “beyond the scope of the Article.”66
63. See, e.g., Kristina M. Campbell, (Un)Reasonable Suspicion: Racial
Profiling in Immigration Enforcement After Arizona v. United States, 3 WAKE
FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 367 (2013); Marjorie Cohn, Racial Profiling Legalized in
Arizona, 1 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 168 (2012); David A. Selden, Julie A. Pace &
Heidi Nunn-Gilman, Placing S.B. 1070 and Racial Profiling into Context, and
What S.B. 1070 Reveals About the Legislative Process in Arizona, 43 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 523 (2011).
64. See Heeren, supra note 3, at 374 (contending that frequent judicial
reliance on federalism and administrative law principles has deflected attention
from the rights of immigrants).
65. See Condon, supra note 1, at 82 n.15, 123 n.186. I have taken a similar
approach in advocating for the extension of the right to counsel to lawful
permanent residents, but not undocumented immigrants, in removal
proceedings. See Kevin R. Johnson, An Immigration Gideon for Lawful
Permanent Residents, 122 YALE L.J. 2394 (2013).
66. Condon, supra note 1, at 123 n.186.
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As Professor Condon acknowledges,67 the Supreme Court’s
decision in Plyler v. Doe,68 recognized Equal Protection rights for
undocumented children. In that landmark case, the Court held
that the Fourteenth Amendment barred the states from
excluding undocumented children from the Texas public schools.
It, however, did so without finding that undocumented
immigrants were a suspect class and thus that the Texas law was
subject to strict scrutiny.69 Nonetheless, by protecting the rights
of undocumented immigrants, Plyler v. Doe might serve as the
touchstone for the possible expansion of the rights of
undocumented immigrants.70
Importantly, all immigrants, not only lawful ones, are
disenfranchised discrete and insular minorities who cannot be
expected to be adequately protected by the political process. The
modern debate over immigration exemplifies how political
majorities may demonize and punish undocumented immigrants,
who are extremely unpopular among certain segments of
American society.71
Modern
examples
of
antipathy
directed
toward
undocumented immigrants are commonplace. Consider the
passage in recent years of stringent immigration enforcement
laws in circumstances strongly suggesting anti-Latina/o, antiimmigrant animus, in Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, and South
Carolina, among other states.72 Donald Trump’s vilification of
Mexican immigrants, as well as the calls for expansion of the wall
on the U.S./Mexico border and a mass deportation campaign
67.
68.

See id. at 121–23.
457 U.S. 202 (1982). See generally MICHAEL A. OLIVAS, NO
UNDOCUMENTED CHILD LEFT BEHIND: PLYLER V. DOE AND THE EDUCATION OF
UNDOCUMENTED SCHOOLCHILDREN (2012) (analyzing the factual and litigation
history of Plyler v. Doe and the impacts of the Supreme Court decision).
69. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. at 219–20, (“[L]egislation directing the onus
of a parent’s misconduct against his children does not comport with
fundamental conceptions of justice.”).
70. Commentators, however, have criticized the decision. See, e.g., Dennis
J. Hutchinson, More Substantive Equal Protection? A Note on Plyler v. Doe,
1982 S. CT. REV. 167, 184 (1982) (“Plyler cut a remarkably messy path through
other areas of the Court’s jurisprudence.”).
71. See, e.g., supra note 38 and accompanying text (discussing Donald
Trump’s derogatory comments about immigrants from Mexico).
72. See supra note 43 (citing cases).
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targeting Mexican immigrants modeled after the infamous
“Operation Wetback,”73 helped build support for his presidential
campaign.74
In sum, Professor Condon leaves it to future scholars to
analyze the Equal Protection rights of undocumented
immigrants, whose vulnerable legal status has increasingly been
recognized in public policy debates and executive actions.75 The
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, and its
proposed expansion, are among the most well-known
contemporary efforts to provide limited legal protections to
undocumented immigrants.76
B. Prospective Immigrants and the Plenary Power Doctrine
As discussed previously,77 Professor Condon’s approach to the
constitutional review of laws discriminating against lawful
immigrants implicates the modern vitality of the much-maligned,
but still intact, plenary power doctrine. One could imagine Equal
Protection doctrine that applies to all immigrants, just as it does
to U.S. citizens, within the territory of the United States.
Persons outside our borders and seeking entry into the country
arguably are beyond the full scope of the Equal Protection

73. See Yanan Wang, “Humane” 1950s Model for Deportation, “Operation
Wetback,”
was
Anything
But,
WASH.
POST
(Nov.
11,
2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/09/30/donaldtrumps-humane-1950s-model-for-deportation-operation-wetback-was-anythingbut/ (last visited July 2, 2016) (describing critically Donald Trump’s deportation
plan) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). See generally JUAN
RAMON GARCÍA, OPERATION WETBACK: THE MASS DEPORTATION OF MEXICAN
UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS IN 1954 (1980) (documenting the history and impacts
of “Operation Wetback”).
74. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
75. See Karen Nelson Moore, Aliens and the Constitution, 88 NYU L. REV.
801, 810–23 (2013) (analyzing the varying Equal Protection rights for different
groups of noncitizens).
76. See United States v. Texas, 2016 U.S. LEXIS 4057 (Supreme Court,
June 23, 2016) (affirming by an equally divided Court the entry of a preliminary
injunction barring the implementation of President Obama’s expanded deferred
action programs); American Dream Act Coalition v. Brewer, 818 F.3d 901, 906
(9th Cir. 2016) (describing the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA)
program).
77. Supra notes 31–37 and accompanying text.
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guarantee.78 One possibility is for more limited judicial review
akin to rational basis review of classifications in the U.S.
immigration laws, a standard that the Supreme Court at times
has applied in reviewing the immigration laws.79
Professor Condon carefully analyzes one aspect of the overall
immigrants’ rights equation—the Equal Protection rights of
lawful immigrants physically present in the United States.
Future scholars hopefully will return to the question of the
constitutional rights of noncitizens seeking admission into the
United States as well as undocumented immigrants.
V. Conclusion
Recent years have seen federalism claims dominate
immigration litigation implicating the rights of immigrants.
Congress and the Executive Branch also have delegated
immigration authority—and the power to discriminate against
immigrants—to the states. In The Preempting of Equal Protection
for Immigrants?, Professor Jenny-Brooke Condon questions the
focus on federalism concerns as opposed to the constitutional
rights of immigrants. She powerfully contends that federalism
analysis should not displace the constitutional rights of
immigrants. Professor Condon’s call for a return to Equal
Protection fundamentals—and a focus on protecting the rights of
noncitizens lawfully in the United States—is refreshing, timely,
and powerful.
In the future, the courts must reconsider their role in
protecting vulnerable undocumented and lawful immigrants in
our communities as well as noncitizens seeking admission into
78. Cf. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 275 (1990)
(holding that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to searches and seizures of
noncitizens by U.S. law enforcement officers outside the United States).
79. See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (acknowledging “the
limited scope of judicial inquiry into immigration legislation”); Kleindienst v.
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972) (requiring that the Attorney General provide a
“facially legitimate and bona fide” reason for denying entry into the United
States of a noncitizen for a temporary visit); see also Gerald L. Neuman, The
Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776-1875), 93 COLUM. L. REV.
1833, 1839 n.31 (1993) (noting that the test articulated by the Supreme Court in
Kleindienst v. Mandel “appears roughly equivalent to the rational basis test”).
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the United States. Scholars must consider whether the lines
drawn by the courts between noncitizens with rights and those
without, are defensible as a matter of constitutional law. By refocusing attention on noncitizen rights Professor Condon has
moved us forward in that all-important task.

